Adaptation and the Boundary of Multinational Firms by Arnaud Costinot et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Bob Gibbons, Richard Baldwin, and participants in the 2008 Hitotsubashi COE conference
for useful comments. All errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Arnaud Costinot, Lindsay Oldenski, and James E. Rauch. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Adaptation and the Boundary of Multinational Firms
Arnaud Costinot, Lindsay Oldenski, and James E. Rauch




What determines the boundary of multinational firms? According to Williamson (1975), a potential
rationale for vertical integration is to facilitate adaptation in a world where uncertainty is resolved
over time. This paper offers the first empirical analysis of the impact of adaptation on the boundary
of multinational firms. To do so, we first develop a ranking of sectors in terms of their "routineness"
by merging two sets of data: (i) ratings of occupations by their intensities in "problem solving" from
the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Information Network; and (ii) U.S. employment shares
of occupations by sectors from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics.
Using U.S. Census trade data, we then demonstrate that, in line with adaptation theories of the firm,
the share of intrafirm trade tends to be higher in less routine sectors. This result is robust to inclusion
of other variables known to influence the U.S. intrafirm import share such as capital intensity, R&D
intensity, relationship specificity, intermediation and productivity dispersion. Our most conservative
estimate suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in average routineness raises the share of










University of California, San Diego




University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
and NBER
jrauch@weber.ucsd.eduAdaptation and Multinational Firms 2
1 Introduction
Many aspects of contractual incompleteness have been analyzed in the theoretical interna-
tional trade literature as explanations for why multinationals should prefer internal versus
external procurement,1 but just two strands of this literature have dominated empirical
application. The older strand (e.g., Ethier 1986, Markusen 1995) emphasizes di¢ culty in en-
forcing intellectual property rights in the countries that host the multinational subsidiaries.
Employing the ￿knowledge capital￿model of multinational ￿rms, these papers argue that
when multinationals have important trade secrets to protect, this is done more easily if the
manufacturing process is kept within the ￿rm. The newer strand (e.g., Antras 2003, Antras
and Helpman 2004, 2008) emphasizes the holdup problem that arises when the multinational
headquarters and its supplier have to make noncontractible relationship-speci￿c investments
ex ante. Applying the insight of Grossman and Hart (1986), these papers argue that prop-
erty rights in the output of the relationship should be held by the party whose incentive to
invest is more important, hence supply should be kept within the multinational ￿rm when
its headquarters makes the larger contribution to the relationship.2
In this paper we emphasize a di⁄erent source of contractual frictions that arises ex post
due to the nonroutine quality of many activities a supplier must undertake for a multinational
headquarters. The premise of our analysis is that some activities are more likely than
others to give rise to problems the nature of which cannot be fully speci￿ed in a contract
ex ante. When these unspeci￿able situations arise the headquarters and its supplier must
adapt, and this adaptation is more e¢ ciently carried out within a ￿rm because incentives for
opportunistic behavior are lower, because ex post renegotiation is less costly or because of
internal communications infrastructure. By emphasizing ex post adaptation in an uncertain
environment, we build on fundamental contributions by Simon (1951) and Williamson (1975)
and on the recent synthesizing work of Tadelis (2002) and Gibbons (2005).3 In section 2
below we describe in more detail the theoretical arguments for why nonroutine activities are
more likely to be supplied internally, but we will not take a stand on which argument is the
most important.
1See Helpman (2006) and Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for recent surveys of this literature.
2Recent empirical tests of the property rights model of the multinational include Feenstra and Hanson
(2005), Yeaple (2006), Defever and Toubal (2007), Tomiura (2007), Bernard et al. (2008), Carluccio and
Fally (2008) and Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008). For empirical tests of the knowledge-capital model, see e.g. Carr
et al. (2001) and Yeaple (2003) .
3For an application of the adaptation approach to vertical integration in the U.S. airline industry, see
Forbes and Lederman (2008).Adaptation and Multinational Firms 3
To investigate whether or not ￿routineness￿is an important determinant of the boundary
of multinational ￿rms, we ￿rst need data on multinational activities. Following Antras
(2003), Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Tre￿ er (2007), and Bernard et al. (2008), we use sector
level data on the intra￿rm imports of U.S. multinationals. The United States is the world￿ s
biggest foreign direct investor, with subsidiaries abroad worth $2.9 trillion in 2006. The
share of U.S. imports that is intra￿rm is both remarkably high, 47% in 2006, and widely
varying across industries, from 4% in footwear to 92% in motor vehicles. It is not surprising
that these data have proven to be a rich source of insight into multinational behavior.
To give empirical content to the notion of ￿routineness￿ we build on the work of Autor,
Levy, and Murnane (2003). They used the U.S. Department of Labor￿ s Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (DOT) to classify occupations as routine or nonroutine. We use the Department
of Labor￿ s successor to the DOT, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET), to order
occupations from lowest to highest intensity in ￿problem solving.￿4 To guide our empirical
analysis, we relate these data to a simple trade model where occupations are interpreted as
￿tasks￿that are embodied in imports by U.S. multinational ￿rms, and intensity in ￿problem
solving￿is interpreted as a measure of the need for ex post adaptation by a headquarters
and a supplier, to which we refer as ￿task routineness.￿Within this environment, we say
that a sector is less routine than another if its distribution of employment over the ranked
tasks is ￿rst-order stochastically dominant.5 The main prediction of our simple trade model
is that if vertical integration increases productivity ex post, but reduces it ex ante, then less
routine sectors should have a higher intra￿rm share of import value.
Keeping as close to our theory as possible for our ￿rst empirical test, we consider sign
tests for all pairs of sectors that can be ranked in terms of routineness. Sign tests o⁄er mild,
but encouraging support for our prediction: in 67% of all cases, the less routine sector has a
higher intra￿rm share of import value. This should not be too surprising since they do not
control for any other determinant of the boundary of multinational ￿rms.
In order to control for these other determinants, we then turn to cross-sector regressions
with country ￿xed e⁄ects. Within chains of sectors that can be ranked in terms of routine-
ness, we ￿nd that average task routineness is a strong predictor of the intra￿rm share of
imports. According to our most conservative estimate, a one standard deviation decrease in
the average task routineness of a sector leads to a 0.26 standard deviation increase in the
share of intra￿rm imports, or an additional 7% of import value that is intra￿rm. This result
4O*NET has also been used by Blinder (2007) and Jensen and Kletzer (2007).
5We come back to the role of this de￿nition, which is central to our empirical strategy, in Section 2.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 4
is robust to inclusion of the other variables shown by previous studies to in￿ uence the U.S.
intra￿rm import share.
As a robustness check, we also rerun these regressions using alternative samples of sectors,
including the full sample of 4-digit NAICS industries, and an alternative sample of countries.
In all cases, we obtain qualitatively similar results: less routine sectors have a higher share of
intra￿rm trade. Overall, we view these results as strongly supportive of the main hypothesis
of our paper: adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary of multinational ￿rms.
In the next section of this paper we develop a simple theoretical model of the determinants
of industry variation in the intra￿rm share of U.S. imports. Section 3 describes our data
sources and provides some descriptive statistics. We present our empirical results in section
4 and robustness checks of these results in section 5. Our conclusions are in section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Basic environment
Consider a world economy with c = 1;:::;C countries; s = 1;:::;S goods or sectors; t =
1;:::;T tasks; and one factor of production, labor, immobile across countries. We denote
by wc the wage per e¢ ciency unit in country c. There are two types of ￿rms, intermediate
suppliers and ￿nal good producers. Intermediate suppliers are present in all countries. They
transform labor into tasks using a constant-returns-to-scale technology. The total output of









c(t) ￿ 0 is the amount of labor allocated to task t in sector s and country c; and
ac (t;X) > 0 is the amount of labor necessary to perform task t once in country c. The
role of X will be described in detail in a moment. Final good producers only are present
in country 1, the United States. They transform tasks into goods using a Cobb-Douglas
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where 1 ￿ bs (t) ￿ 0 and
PT
t=1 bs (t) = 1. We refer to bs (t) as the intensity of task t in
sector s. All markets are perfectly competitive. Final goods are freely traded, whereas tasks
are nontraded. Under these assumptions, Y s
c represents the quantity of U.S. imports from
country c 6= 1 in sector s. In our model, tasks are ￿embodied￿in imports, like factor services
in traditional trade models.
2.2 Adaptation and the make-or-buy decision
For each task, there exist two states of the world, ￿routine￿and ￿problematic￿ . Tasks only
di⁄er in their probabilities ￿(t) of being in the routine state. ￿(t) ￿ 0 is an exogenous
characteristic of a task, to which we refer as its routineness. Without loss of generality, we
index tasks such that higher tasks are less routine, ￿0(t) < 0.
For each task and each country, ￿nal good producers in the United States can choose
between two organizations, X 2 fO;Ig. Under organization I (Integration), U.S. ￿nal good
producers own their intermediate suppliers at home or abroad, whereas under organization O
(Outsourcing), intermediate suppliers are independently owned. The premise of our analysis
is that ￿rms￿organizational choices a⁄ect productivity at the task level both ex ante and
ex post. Let ac (t;X) > 0 denote the amount of labor necessary to perform task t once in
country c under organization X. We assume that ac (t;X) can be decomposed into
ac (t;X) = ￿c(X) + [1 ￿ ￿(t)]￿c (X) (3)
where ￿c(X) > 0 is the ex ante unit labor requirement, and ￿c (X) > 0 is an additional
ex post unit labor requirement capturing the amount of labor necessary to deal with the
problematic state.
The central hypothesis of our paper is that:
H0. In any country c = 1;:::;C, integration lowers productivity ex ante, ￿c(I) > ￿c(O), but
increases productivity ex post, ￿c (I) < ￿c (O).
According to H0, the basic trade-o⁄ associated with the make-or-buy decision is that
integrated parties are less productive ex ante, but more productive ex post. Though H0
admittedly is reduced form, there are many theoretical reasons, as we brie￿ y mention in the
introduction, why it may hold in practice:
1. Opportunism. It is standard to claim that external suppliers have stronger incentives
to exert e⁄ort than internal suppliers (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Holmstrom 1982),Adaptation and Multinational Firms 6
so that contracting out yields a cost advantage to headquarters ex ante. When problems
require the parties to go beyond the contract ex post, however, opportunities for suppliers
to ￿cut corners￿may open up and their stronger incentives to reduce costs can back￿re on
headquarters (Tadelis 2002).6
2. Renegotiation. Although contracting out reduces cost ex ante, an arm￿ s length contract
between headquarters and a supplier can lead to costly delays ex post when problems force
renegotiation (Bajari and Tadelis 2001). Exercise of command and control within the ￿rm
avoids renegotiation costs.
3. Communication. Cremer, Garicano, and Prat (2007) argue that agents within the bound-
ary of a ￿rm develop a common ￿code￿or ￿language￿to facilitate communication.7 Building
up this communications infrastructure is a super￿ uous expense when a standard contract
can convey all necessary information to a supplier ex ante, but if problems arise ex post that
a contract does not cover, a common language shared by the headquarters and the supplier
will reduce the cost of the communication necessary to resolve them.
2.3 Testable implications
Let X￿
c(t) 2 fO;Ig denote the organization chosen by ￿nal good producers (if any) purchas-






The ￿rst implication of our theory can be stated as follows.
Lemma 1 Suppose that H0 holds. Then for any country c = 1;:::;C, there exists t￿
c 2
f0;:::;Ng s.t. task t is outsourced if and only if t ￿ t￿
c.
Proof. Let ￿c (t) ￿ ac (t;O) ￿ ac (t;I). By Equation (3), we have
￿c (t) = [￿c(O) ￿ ￿c(I)] + [1 ￿ ￿(t)][￿c (O) ￿ ￿c (I)]
6Tadelis in turn cites Williamson (1985, p. 140), who wrote that ￿low powered incentives have well known
adaptability advantages.￿
7Their model is based on the Arrow (1974) conception of the ￿rm as a community specialized in the
creation and transfer of knowledge. Azoulay (2004) ￿nds that pharmaceutical ￿rms assign ￿knowledge-
intensive￿projects to internal teams and outsource ￿data-intensive￿projects.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 7
Since ￿0(t) < 0, H0 implies that ￿c (t) is strictly increasing in t. Therefore, if X￿
c(t0) = I for
t0 2 f1;:::;Ng, then Equation (4) implies X￿
c(t) = I for all t ￿ t0. Lemma 1 directly derives
from this observation.
Although Lemma 1 o⁄ers a simple way to test H0 on task-level data, such disaggregated
data unfortunately are not available. In our empirical analysis, we only have access to sector-
level import data. With this in mind, we now derive su¢ cient conditions under which one
can relate H0 to these sector-level data. We introduce the following de￿nition.







(t) for all 1 ￿ t0 ￿ T:
Broadly speaking, we say that a sector s is less routine than another sector s0 if it is
relatively more intensive in the less routine tasks. Formally, s is less routine than s0 if the
distribution of task intensities in s ￿rst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of
task intensities in s0.8 This implies that if s is less routine than s0 in the sense of De￿nition
1, then the average routineness of tasks in sector s, ￿s ￿
X
bs (t)￿(t), is lower than the
average routineness of tasks in s0. Of course, the converse is not true. Hence, our notion of
a sector being ￿less routine￿is a stronger one.
Let ￿s
c denote the share of the value of imports from country c in sector s that is intra￿rm.
Proposition 1 Suppose that H0 holds. Then for any country c = 1;:::;C, the share of the
value of imports that is intra￿rm is higher in less routine sectors.












where pc(t) is the price of task t in country c under free trade. By Equation (2), we can




















8Recall that 1 ￿ bs (t) ￿ 0 and
PT
t=1 bs (t) = 1 for all s.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 8
Equation (5) and Inequality (6) imply that for any country c = 1;:::;C, the intra￿rm share
of import value is higher in less routine sectors.
Before we turn to our empirical analysis, a few comments are in order. First, as we will
see in Section 3.3, the value of intra￿rm U.S. imports is measured in practice as the total
value of shipments declared by U.S. multinationals to be from ￿related parties.￿To go from
our simple theory to the data, we will make the implicit assumption that the probability
that a U.S. multinational declares a shipment to be from ￿related parties￿is monotonically
increasing in the share of that shipment￿ s value that is intra￿rm.
Second, there are no technological di⁄erences across countries. Equation (2) requires that
tasks always are combined with the same technology: task intensity, bs (t), does not vary
with c.9 This feature of the model allows us to infer the task composition of U.S. imports
from U.S. (rather than Foreign) data on employment across tasks.
Third, it is worth emphasizing that H0 does not imply that the share of intra￿rm trade
should be higher in sectors with lower average routineness of tasks. To see this, consider the
following example with three tasks, t = 1;2;3, and two sectors, s = 1;2. Suppose that the
levels of task routineness are such that ￿(1) = 1, ￿(2) = 0:5, and ￿(3) = 0; task intensities
in sector 1 are such that b1 (1) = 0, b1 (2) = 1, and b1 (3) = 0; and task intensities in sector
2 are such that b2 (1) = 0:9, b2 (2) = 0, and b2 (3) = 0:1. By construction, the average task
routineness in sector 2 (0:9) is strictly higher than the average task routineness in sector
1 (0:5). Yet, if t￿
c = 2, the share of intra-￿rm trade is strictly higher in sector 2! This is
an important observation, which will be at the core of our empirical strategy. In order to
test H0 with sector level data, one needs to restrict the sample of sectors to those whose
routineness can be ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1.
Finally, we wish to point out that the fact that any task is either always outsourced or
always performed in house is not crucial for Proposition 1. In a generalized version of our
model where less routine tasks are less likely to be outsourced￿ because of other unspeci￿ed
sector characteristics￿ Proposition 1 would still hold.10
9Since all tasks are assumed to be nontraded, our model also rules out the fragmentation of the production
process, which may be another important source of technological di⁄erences in practice. See e.g. Feenstra
and Hanson (1996) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) for trade models developed along those lines.
10This directly derives from the fact that if a distribution F ￿rst-order stochastically dominates another
distribution G, then the expected value of any increasing function is higher under F than under G.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 9
3 Data
To investigate empirically whether adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary
of multinationals, we ￿rst need measures of: (i) routineness at the task level, ￿(t); (ii) task




We de￿ne a task t as a 2-digit occupation in the Standard Occupational Classi￿cation (SOC)
system. To measure how routine each of these tasks is, we use the U.S. Department of
Labor￿ s Occupational Information Network (O*NET). This database includes measures of
the importance of more than 200 worker and occupational characteristics in about 800 6-
digit occupations. Such characteristics include ￿nger dexterity, oral expression, thinking
creatively, operating machines, general physical activities, analyzing data, and interacting
with computers. In this paper, we use the importance of ￿making decisions and solving
problems￿as our index of how routine a task is. Formally, we measure the routineness ￿(t)
of a task t as





where ￿ is a 6-digit occupation; ￿(￿;t) 2 [0;1] is the employment share of occupations ￿ in
task t in 2006; and P(￿) 2 [0;100] is the importance of problem solving for occupation ￿ in
O*NET. Table 1 ranks the 17 tasks in our sample from least to most routine.
3.2 Sector Data
We de￿ne a sector as a 4-digit industry in the North American Industry Classi￿cation System















Since task intensity, bs (t), does not vary with c, we can measure it using data on the share
of employment of that 2-digit occupation in any country. In the rest of this paper, we use
U.S. data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics 2006.
By De￿nition 1 and Equation (7), a sector s is less routine than a sector s0 if and only ifAdaptation and Multinational Firms 10
Table 1: Ranking of Tasks from Least to Most Routine
Task




5 Architecture and engineering
6 Business and ￿nancial operations
7 Life, physical, and social sciences
8 Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media
9 Construction and extraction
10 Installation, maintenance, and repair
11 O¢ ce and administrative support
12 Farming, ￿shing, and forestry
13 Production
14 Transportation and material moving
15 Sales and related occupations
16 Food preparation and serving
17 Cleaning and maintenance
its distribution of employment across tasks dominates the distribution in s0 in terms of ￿rst
order stochastic dominance. Table 2 summarizes the 77 sectors in our sample ranked by
their average routineness ￿s =
X
bs (t)￿(t). Asterisks denote chains of sectors that can be
ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1.
3.3 Trade data
All trade data are from the U.S. Census Bureau Related Party Trade database and cover the
years 2000 though 2006.11 Variables reported in this database include the total value of all
11The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) also collects data on intra￿rm imports in its benchmark surveys
of U.S. direct investment abroad and of foreign direct investment in the US. We use the Census data rather
than the BEA data for several reasons. First, the Census data are publicly available. A subset of the BEA
data is public, however the full dataset is restricted. Second, when reporting intra￿rm trade between foreign
owned multinationals and their US a¢ liates the BEA uses the country of ownership rather than the country
in which the shipment originated. This is problematic for imports by U.S a¢ liates of foreign parents from
other foreign a¢ liates of the same parent that are located in di⁄erent countries. Finally, BEA conducts
benchmark surveys approximately every 5 years and smaller annual surveys in non-benchmark years, with
the ￿rm size cuto⁄ for inclusion in these surveys changing over time. However, for robustness, we also test
our model using the BEA data and get similar results.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 11
Table 2: Ranking of Sectors from Lowest to Highest Average Routineness
1 Computer equipment 40 Aluminium
2 Basic chemicals 41 Nonferrous (exc alum)
3 Pharmaceuticals 42 Household appliances
4 Pulp, paper, etc. 43 O¢ ce furniture*
5 Other chemical 44 Transport equip, nesoi
6 Communications equip 45 Other fabricated metal
7 Converted paper 46 Lime & gypsum
8 Pesticides, etc. 47 Tobacco products
9 Paints & adhesives 48 Ships & boats
10 Crowns/closures/seals 49 Dairy
11 Magnetic & optical media 50 Grain & oilseed milling
12 Aerospace* 51 Boilers & containers
13 Audio & video 52 Foods, nesoi
14 Syn rubber & ￿bers 53 Purchased steel products
15 Engines & turbines 54 Plastics
16 Cutlery & handtools 55 Fruit & veg preserves
17 Petroleum & coal 56 Other nonmetallic
18 Medical equip & supplies 57 Architect & struct metals
19 Hardware 58 Fabrics
20 Elec equip, nesoi 59 Other textiles
21 Foundries 60 Springs & wire**
22 Clay & refractory 61 Motor vehicles
23 Semiconductors, etc.** 62 Textile furnishings
24 Cement and concrete 63 Sugar & confectionary
25 Electric lighting equipment 64 Finished fabrics*
26 Electrical equipment* 65 Fibers, yarns & threads
27 Sawmill & wood 66 Furniture, nesoi**
28 Ag & cnstrct machinery* 67 Railroad rolling stock
29 Engineered wood 68 Apparel
30 Industrial machinery 69 Bakeries & tortillas*
31 Other wood 70 Apparel accessories
32 Motor vhcle bodies 71 Glass & glass products
33 Household furniture 72 Animal foods
34 Other machinery 73 Other leather
35 Rubber 74 Leather & hide tanning
36 Iron & steel 75 Footwear
37 Beverages 76 Seafood*
38 Motor vehicle parts 77 Meat products
39 Bolts, nuts, screws, etc.
*Chain of sectors that can be ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1 (Small Sample)
**Chain of sectors that can be ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1 (Large Sample)Adaptation and Multinational Firms 12
Table 3: Ranking of Sectors by Share of Intra￿rm Imports in 2006
Sector Share Sector Share
Motor vehicles 0.92 Glass & glass products 0.35
Pharmaceuticals 0.80 Bolts, nuts, screws, etc. 0.35
Magnetic & optical media 0.71 Bakeries & tortillas 0.35
Semiconductors, etc. 0.69 Fruit &veg preserves 0.34
Transportation equip, nesoi 0.68 Converted paper 0.33
Computer equipment 0.67 Boilers & containers 0.33
Audio & video equip 0.64 Products from purchased steel 0.32
Rubber products 0.64 Cutlery & handtools 0.32
Medical equip & supplies 0.64 Cement and concrete 0.32
Electrical equipment 0.63 Aerospace 0.32
Syn rubber & ￿bers 0.63 O¢ ce furniture 0.29
Engines & turbines 0.61 Springs & wire 0.28
Communications equip 0.60 Electric lighting equipment 0.28
Pesticides, fertilizers, etc. 0.60 Crowns/closures/seals 0.28
Petroleum & coal 0.60 Beverages 0.28
Other chemical products 0.59 Plastics 0.27
Paints & adhesives 0.59 Grain & oilseed milling 0.27
Ag & cnstrct machinery 0.59 Foundries 0.27
Motor vehicle parts 0.57 Lime & gypsum 0.26
Basic chemicals 0.56 Clay & refractory 0.26
Aluminium 0.55 Architech & struct metals 0.24
Elec components, nesoi 0.50 Nonferrous (exc alum) 0.24
Railroad rolling stock 0.49 Furniture related, nesoi 0.23
Motor vhcle bodies 0.48 Other wood 0.23
Other machinery 0.46 Engineered wood 0.22
Sugar & confectionary 0.45 Other nonmetallic mineral 0.20
Pulp, paper & paperboard 0.43 Fabrics 0.20
Industrial machinery 0.42 Other textiles 0.19
Hardware 0.40 Meat prdcts & packaging 0.18
other fabricated metal 0.40 Sawmill & wood 0.18
Household appliances 0.40 Seafood 0.17
Iron & steel 0.39 Apparel 0.14
Animal foods 0.39 Apparel accessories 0.13
Tobacco products 0.38 Other leather 0.13
Dairy 0.38 Household furniture 0.12
Finished textile fabrics 0.37 Fibers, yarns & threads 0.11
Leather tanning 0.36 Textile furnishings 0.10
Ships & boats 0.36 Footwear 0.04
Foods, nesoi 0.36Adaptation and Multinational Firms 13
Table 4: Correlation of Sector Characteristics
rtne ln(K/L) ln(S/L) ln(RD) spcfcty intrmd dsprsn
routine 1
ln(K/L) -0.390 1
ln(S/L) -0.581 0.427 1
ln(R&D) -0.553 0.195 0.466 1
speci￿city -0.126 -0.409 0.178 0.415 1
intermediation 0.495 -0.485 -0.447 -0.485 -0.036 1
dispersion -0.183 0.470 0.279 0.194 0.0669 -0.250 1
U.S. imports and the value of related party, or intra￿rm, U.S. imports. Imports are classi￿ed
as intra￿rm if one of the parties owns at least 6% of the other. The data originate with a
Customs form that accompanies all shipments entering the U.S. and asks for the value of
the shipment and whether or not the transaction is with a related party. These data are
collected at the 10-digit HS level and reported at the 2 though 6-digit level for both HS and
NAICS codes. We use the 4-digit NAICS data for our baseline analysis. Table 3 gives a
ranking of these sectors by share of intra￿rm imports in total U.S. imports for 2006. We
constrain our sample to include only the largest exporters to the U.S., comprising 99 percent
of all U.S. imports. This results in a set of 55 exporters in 77 sectors over 7 years.
3.4 Controls
We use data on capital intensity, skill intensity, R&D intensity, relationship speci￿city, the
distribution of ￿rm size, and the level of intermediation to control for other known deter-
minants of the boundary of multinationals. Data on the relative capital and skilled labor
intensities of industries are from the NBER Manufacturing Database. Capital intensity is
measured as the ratio of the total capital stock to total employment. Skill intensity is mea-
sured as the ratio of nonproduction workers to production workers in a given industry. As
in Antras (2003), data on the ratio of research and development spending to sales are from
the 1977 U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Line of Business Survey. To control for
variations in the importance of relationship speci￿c investments, we use the index developed
by Nunn (2007) based on the Rauch (1999) classi￿cation. In the spirit of Yeaple (2006), we
also use Compustat data on the standard deviation of sales of ￿rms in an industry to control
for productivity dispersion within an industry. Finally, we follow Bernard, Jensen, Redding,
and Schott (2008) and use the weighted average of retail and wholesale employment sharesAdaptation and Multinational Firms 14
of importing ￿rms in an industry as a control for intermediation. Table 4 gives correlations
for all of the variables described above as well as sector average routineness.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Sign tests
Proposition 1 o⁄ers a simple way to test H0. For any pair of sectors, if one is less routine
than the other in the sense of De￿nition 1, then exporter by exporter, it should have a
higher share of intra￿rm trade. 67 of the 77 industries in our sample exhibit stochastic
dominance over at least one other sector and 67 industries are dominated by at least one
other sector. Only two sectors (motor vehicles and railroad rolling stock) neither dominate
nor are dominated by any other sector. Out of the 27,081 possible comparisons in our data
for 2006 (pair sectors*countries), 18,002 have the right signs. In other words, in 67% of all
cases, the less routine sector has a higher share of intra￿rm trade. Overall, we view this ￿rst
look at the data as surprisingly encouraging. Recall that Proposition 1 assumes away any
other determinant of the boundary of US multinationals!
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of our sign tests using 2006 data broken down by
countries and sectors. Each sector-level sign test includes all observations for which a given
industry is either the dominant or the dominated sector in the pair. There is a substantial
amount of variation across countries. Success rates of the sign tests range from 30% in
Peru to 100% in Algeria. Based on these results, there is little evidence that technological
di⁄erences are a major issue for our approach. Algeria, Cambodia and China are among
the most successful countries. There also is a substantial amount of variation across sectors.
Success rates range from 43% for tobacco products to 86% for petroleum and coal products.
The poor performance of our theory for tobacco products clearly suggests that other sector
characteristics, such as capital intensity, also a⁄ect the boundary of multinational ￿rms. In
order to address this issue, we now turn to cross-sector regressions.
4.2 Cross-sector regressions
We consider linear regressions of the form
￿
s
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Table 5: Sign Tests, Country by Country, 2006
Country (Ny) Sign Country (Ny) Sign
Test Test
Algeria (13) 1.00* Jamaica (228) 0.46
Argentina (557) 0.50 Japan (581) 0.72*
Australia (567) 0.79* Korea (581) 0.72*
Austria (501) 0.70* Macao (134) 0.81*
Bangladesh (169) 0.67* Malaysia (562) 0.67*
Belgium (295) 0.53* Mexico (581) 0.64*
Brazil (580) 0.67* Netherlands (581) 0.65*
Cambodia (60) 0.87* Netherlands Antilles (136) 0.77*
Canada (581) 0.50 New Zealand (553) 0.43*
Chile (505) 0.52 Norway (543) 0.68*
China (581) 0.85* Pakistan (337) 0.42*
Columbia (545) 0.54* Peru (442) 0.30*
Costa Rica (546) 0.65* Philippines (558) 0.79*
Denmark (581) 0.58* Poland (545) 0.62*
Dominican Republic (507) 0.65* Portugal (516) 0.71*
Egypt (359) 0.67* Saudi Arabia (211) 0.85*
El Salvador (314) 0.45* Singapore (550) 0.82*
Finland (536) 0.72* South Africa (568) 0.82*
France (568) 0.70* Spain (581) 0.78*
Germany (581) 0.67* Sri Lanka (295) 0.54
Guatemala (369) 0.50 Sweden (581) 0.69*
Honduras (284) 0.60* Switzerland (577) 0.79*
Hong Kong (365) 0.78* Thailand (581) 0.83*
Hungary (473) 0.61* Trinidad (342) 0.55*
India (565) 0.80* Turkey (553) 0.57*
Indonesia (565) 0.67* United Kingdom (581) 0.68*
Ireland (560) 0.76* Venezuela (477) 0.47
Israel (561) 0.75* Vietnam (532) 0.66*
Italy (568) 0.84*
*Signi￿cant at the 5% level
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Table 6: Sign Tests, Sector by Sector, 2006
Sector(Ny) Test Sector(Ny) Test
Animal foods (686) 0.70* Lime & gypsum (74) 0.61*
Grain & oilseed 418) 0.64* Other nonmetallic (346) 0.65*
Sugar & confectionary (2014) 0.64* Iron & steel (398) 0.69*
Fruit & veg preserves (1535) 0.68* Steel products (583) 0.61*
Dairy (1284) 0.71* Aluminium (484) 0.56*
Meat products (623) 0.79* Other nonferrous (571) 0.66*
Seafood (2112) 0.80* Foundries (204) 0.54
Bakeries & tortillas (3097) 0.67* Closures & seals (221) 0.52
Foods, nesoi (980) 0.58* Cutlery & handtools (587) 0.67*
Beverages (1049) 0.74* Structural metals (746) 0.60*
Tobacco products (373) 0.43* Boilers & containers (768) 0.62*
Fibers, yarns & threads (177) 0.67* Hardware (441) 0.68*
Fabrics (302) 0.64* Springs & wire (596) 0.69*
Finished fabrics (878) 0.64* Bolts, nuts, etc. (222) 0.68*
Textile furnishings (409) 0.58* Other fabr metal (559) 0.69*
Other textiles (469) 0.63* Ag & cnstrct machinery (940) 0.74*
Apparel (558) 0.67* Industrial machinery (489) 0.62*
Apparel accessories (898) 0.67* Engines & turbines (1356) 0.68*
Leather tanning (291) 0.79* Other machinery (575) 0.72*
Footwear (355) 0.65* Computer equip (678) 0.77*
Other leather (167) 0.71* Comm equip (505) 0.72*
Sawmill & wood (373) 0.77* Audio & video (573) 0.70*
Engineered wood (541) 0.62* Semiconductors, etc. (2484) 0.75*
Other wood (666) 0.65* Mag & optical media (331) 0.53
Pulp & paper (1010) 0.54* Lighting equipment (151) 0.61*
Converted paper (373) 0.66* Appliances (486) 0.65*
Petroleum & coal (42) 0.86* Electrical equip (1569) 0.78*
Basic chemicals (1570) 0.73* Electrical, nesoi (675) 0.74*
Syn rubber & ￿bers (1432) 0.68* Motor vhcle bodies (231) 0.71*
Fertilizers, etc. (404) 0.64* Motor vehicle parts (766) 0.78*
Pharmaceuticals (278) 0.67* Aerospace (3025) 0.46
Paints & adhesives (379) 0.63* Ships & boats (326) 0.49
Other chemical (638) 0.64* transportation, nesoi (990) 0.56*
Plastics (523) 0.55* Household furniture (512) 0.69*
Rubber (298) 0.59* O¢ ce furniture (619) 0.67*
Clay & refractory (815) 0.63* Furniture, nesoi (966) 0.75*
Glass (327) 0.56* Medical equipment (638) 0.72*
Cement & concrete (133) 0.68*
*Signi￿cant at the 5% level
y N=(number of sectors each industry either dominates or is dominated by)*
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Table 7: Regressions for Chain of Sectors Ranked in the Sense of De￿nition 1 (Small Sample)
Model : 1 2 3 4 5
N: 2695 2695 2695 2695 2695
Dependent variable is the share of intra￿rm imports
routine -0.257*** -0.314*** -1.276*** -1.425*** -1.310***
(-7.87) (-5.45) (-10.57) (-7.42) (-10.38)
ln(K/L) 0.095** 0.914*** 1.092*** 0.942***
(2.02) (8.52) (5.30) (8.50)
ln(S/L) -0.263*** -1.023*** -1.153*** -1.089***
(-3.93) (-9.50) (-6.96) (-8.75)
ln(R&D) 0.217*** 0.416*** 0.454*** 0.389***
(5.53) (9.17) (7.55) (7.56)






￿xed e⁄ects country country country country country
year year year year year
R-sq 0.243 0.311 0.364 0.365 0.365
Standardized beta coe¢ cients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006.
*,** and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Standard errors are clustered by country-industry.
T-statistics are in parentheses.
where ￿c is a country ￿xed e⁄ect; ￿s is the average routineness of sector s; and Zs is a vector
of controls. Holding Zs ￿xed, Proposition 1 predicts that under H0, less routine sectors
should have a higher share of intra-￿rm trade.12 In other words, if we restrict ourselves to a
chain of sectors that can be ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1, then we should observe that
￿ < 0.13
Table 7 presents the OLS estimates of Equation (8) for the 7 industries that can be
ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1 for all years in our sample. In order to allow for comparison
across right-hand-side variables, we report beta coe¢ cients, which have been standardized to
12Formally, if ex ante productivity can be written as ￿c(X;Zs), then ceteris paribus, less routine sectors
have a higher share of intra-￿rm trade.
13Recall that, in general, H0 has no implications for the impact of ￿s on the share of intra-￿rm trade.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 18
represent the change in the intra￿rm import share that results from a one standard deviation
change in each independent variable. In all speci￿cations, the OLS estimate of ￿ is negative
and statistically signi￿cant, implying that less routine sectors have a higher share of intra￿rm
imports. Regarding the impact of other sector characteristics, our results are consistent with
the empirical ￿ndings of Antras (2003). Capital intensity and R&D intensity tend to increase
the share of intra￿rm trade, whereas skill intensity tends to decrease it. By contrast, in this
sample of seven sectors the impact of the dispersion of ￿rm size, relationship speci￿city
and intermediation di⁄er from the results of Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008), and
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2008), respectively. In Section 5, we return to these
regressions using the full set of manufacturing industries, as in the aforementioned studies.
As we will see, the qualitative results from all of these previous studies are replicated in this
case.
In terms of magnitude, the impact of routineness is larger than that of capital intensity,
speci￿city, intermediation, and dispersion in all speci￿cations reported in Table 7. Using the
speci￿cation with the smallest coe¢ cient on routineness as a lower bound, we ￿nd that a
one standard deviation decrease in the routineness level of a sector leads to a 0.26 standard
deviation increase in the share of intra￿rm imports, or an additional 7% of total imports
that are within ￿rm. We view these results as strongly supportive of the main hypothesis of
our paper: adaptation is an important determinant of the boundary of multinational ￿rms.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Alternative sample of sectors
An obvious drawback of the results presented in Section 4 is that they rely on a sample of
only seven sectors. In order to increase the size of our sample, we now weaken the criteria
under which two sectors can be ranked in the sense of De￿nition 1. Instead of requiring
the distribution of task intensities in a given sector to dominate the distribution of task
intensities in another sector for all years, we only require that this ranking holds for at
least one year in our sample. The broad rationale for this alternative criterion is that the
absence of dominance from one year to the next may simply be due to measurement errors
in occupation shares. By following this approach, we extend our sample to ten sectors; see
Table 2 for details. Our OLS estimates using this new sample are reported in Table 8. As
in Section 4, the impact of routineness is negative, statistically signi￿cant, and larger inAdaptation and Multinational Firms 19
Table 8: Regressions for Chain of Sectors Ranked in the Sense of De￿nition 1 (Large Sample)
Model : 1 2 3 4 5
N: 3850 3850 3850 3850 3850
Dependent variable is the share of intra￿rm imports
routine -0.256*** -0.282*** -0.406*** -0.486*** -0.610***
(-9.57) (-6.00) (-7.15) (-8.98) (-9.63)
ln(K/L) 0.193*** 0.252*** 0.231*** 0.332***
(4.73) (5.76) (5.38) (6.50)
ln(S/L) -0.267*** -0.317*** -0.367*** -0.600***
(-5.10) (-6.02) (-7.01) (-7.21)
ln(R&D) 0.257*** 0.297*** 0.327*** 0.223***
(6.88) (7.73) (8.52) (4.54)






￿xed e⁄ects country country country country country
year year year year year
R-sq 0.211 0.313 0.32 0.342 0.349
Standardized beta coe¢ cients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006.
*,** and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Standard errors are clustered by country-industry.
T-statistics are in parentheses.
absolute value than the impacts of the other control variables.
As an additional robustness check, we reestimate Equation (8) using the full set of 4-
digit NAICS industries. The results are presented Table 9.14 The coe¢ cient on routineness
remains negative and statistically signi￿cant in all of these speci￿cations. In line with our
theory, the results using all manufacturing industries are not quite as strong as those using
chains of sectors satisfying De￿nition 1. Nevertheless, the impact of routineness is still more
important than capital intensity, skill intensity, speci￿city, intermediation and dispersion.
Finally, note that unlike in previous regressions, these last results also are consistent with
14In yet another robustness check, we also considered 6-digit NAICS level sectors instead of 4-digit NAICS
in our regressions using the industry-level weighted average problem solving score. The results were quali-
tatively similar.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 20
Table 9: Regressions for 4-Digit NAICS Manufacturing Sectors
Model : 1 2 3 4 5
N: 29505 29505 29505 29505 29505
Dependent variable is the share of intra￿rm imports
routine -0.179*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.069***
(-17.75) (-4.78) (-4.98) (-4.83) (-5.07)
ln(K/L) 0.031** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.055***
(2.43) (4.82) (4.41) (2.99)
ln(S/L) 0.007 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015
(0.46) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.97)
ln(R&D) 0.174*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.137***
(12.56) (9.51) (9.02) (9.12)






￿xed e⁄ects country country country country country
year year year year year
R-sq 0.213 0.235 0.238 0.238 0.24
Standardized beta coe¢ cients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006.
*,** and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Standard errors are clustered by country-industry.
T-statistics are in parentheses.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 21
Table 10: Regressions for Chain of Sectors Ranked in the Sense of De￿nition 1 (Small Sample)
for Restricted Set of Countries
Model : 1 2 3 4 5
N: 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323
Dependent variable is the share of intra￿rm imports
routine -0.210*** -0.203*** -0.988*** -1.03*** -0.997***
(-4.72) (-2.77) (-5.69) (-4.02) (-5.60)
ln(K/L) 0.094 0.765*** 0.819*** 0.773***
(1.49) (5.09) (2.93) (4.98)
ln(S/L) -0.201** -0.815*** -0.854*** -0.834***
(-2.40) (-5.38) (-3.88) (-4.92)
ln(R&D) 0.261*** 0.420*** 0.432*** 0.412***
(4.86) (6.68) (5.18) (5.92)






￿xed e⁄ects country country country country country
year year year year year
R-sq 0.229 0.302 0.337 0.337 0.337
Standardized beta coe¢ cients reported for pooled data from 2000 to 2006.
*,** and *** indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.
Standard errors are clustered by country-industry.
T-statistics are in parentheses.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 22
previous empirical ￿ndings of Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Tre￿ er (2008), and Bernard, Jensen,
Redding and Schott (2008). Productivity dispersion and relationship speci￿city tend to
increase the share of intra￿rm trade, whereas intermediation tends to decrease it.
5.2 Alternative sample of countries
One drawback of the Census data is that they do not distinguish between imports by U.S.-
owned multinationals from their foreign a¢ liates and imports by U.S. a¢ liates of foreign-
owned multinationals.15 Since our theoretical framework focuses on the former case, we also
run our regressions using the restricted sample of countries proposed by Nunn and Tre￿ er
(2008). A country is included in the restricted sample if at least two-thirds of intra￿rm U.S.
imports from that country are imported by U.S.-owned ￿rms. Nunn and Tre￿ er construct
this sample using data on intra￿rm U.S. imports by country and parent in 1997 from Zeile
(2003). The results using this restricted set of countries are presented in Table 10. In line
with the results using the full sample of countries, the coe¢ cient on routineness is negative
and statistically signi￿cant in all speci￿cations.16
6 Conclusion
Nonroutine activities a supplier must undertake for a multinational headquarters are more
likely than routine activities to give rise to problems ex post the nature of which cannot be
fully speci￿ed in a contract ex ante. A strand of the literature stretching back to Simon (1951)
and Williamson (1975) that we refer to as ￿adaptation theories￿of the ￿rm implies that
multinationals are more likely to supply nonroutine than routine activities internally. We
tested this prediction using sector level data on the intra￿rm imports of U.S. multinationals
from the Census and occupation level data from the U.S. Department of Labor￿ s Occupational
Information. Using both non parametric sign tests and cross-sector regressions, we found
that less routine sectors tend to have a higher share of intra￿rm trade. This result is robust
to inclusion of other variables known to in￿ uence the U.S. intra￿rm import share such as
capital intensity, R&D intensity, relationship speci￿city, intermediation and productivity
15A second drawback is that we only have data on intra￿rm imports relative to total imports by all U.S.
￿rms, not relative to U.S. imports by multinationals, which would do a better job of capturing the share of
inputs imported by multinationals that are intra￿rm. This drawback, unfortunately, is common to both the
U.S. Census and BEA data.
16We also re-run the regressions presented in Tables 8 and 9 using this restricted set of countries and
obtain results that are similar to those using the full sample of countries.Adaptation and Multinational Firms 23
dispersion. Our most conservative estimate suggests that a one standard deviation decrease
in average routineness raises the share of intra￿rm imports by 0.26 standard deviations, or
an additional 7% of imports that are intra￿rm. To us, these results indicate that routineness
is a key determinant of the boundary of multinational ￿rms, and that ￿adaptation theories￿
of the ￿rm merit further development and empirical application in the multinational context.
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